Nº 2605/2606 - Fevereiro/Março de 2019 - Número Temático
War compasses: diplomatic realignment between the war of Rosellon and the war of Oranges in the days of Gomes Freire de Andrade

Ainoa Chinchilla Galarzo

Throughout the 18th century, both Spain and Portugal decided to join the two great powers of the moment: France and England, respectively, in order to maintain their overseas empires. The defense of these territories depended on the threat of the dominant maritime power of the moment: England; therefore, these two States were forced to choose one of the two options. As we already know, the alignments of France with Spain and, on the other hand, of England with Portugal, would lead them to be in opposing positions throughout the eighteenth century[1]. In the first place, the decision of the Spanish government was due to their capacity to face the maritime strength of the English, which was not enough. Spain needed France´s support to fight against the hegemony which the English intended at sea, since the French power was becoming the rival to take into account. Therefore, the Spanish government decided to join its steps to those of France with the signing of three Family Pacts[2].

On the other hand, Portugal, as a gateway to the Atlantic Ocean, needed British aid to keep its overseas territories, since its interests and reality were wholly linked to the control of the sea. Hence the alliance with the English nation, was ratified in the treaty of Methuen of 1703. These alignments allowed each of them to have the help of their ally in case it was needed, while leaving room for the own politics of each State. However, the arrival of the French Revolution would change everything[3]. Even the relations of friendship that had occurred throughout the 18th century between Portugal and Spain, which had been endorsed by the Treaty of El Pardo in 1778.


Diplomatic realignment during the War of Roussillon (1793-1795)

In 1793, after the execution of Louis XVI of France, the majority of the European powers were forced to fight to keep their monarchical principles. In February of that same year, France declared war on England and, immediately after, she declared it on Spain[4]. The war of Roussillon had begun, in which the monarchical powers faced the new revolutionary power. In May, the diplomatic order established to date was subverted: Spain and England, which had been enemies throughout the whole century, signed an alliance to fight against the Revolution, closing the long chapter of the Family Pacts with France[5]. To this threat, Portugal would join a few months later, due to the great damage caused by the war in its commerce and the fear of being isolated, after the failed attempt of a triple alliance with the Spanish and English cabinets[6]. For this reason, Portugal will sign an alliance treaty next to Spain on July 15 of 1793 and with Great Britain on September 26. Portugal was not issued a formal declaration of war by France. Although it took the initiative by sending 6,000 men to fight with the Spanish troops in the Pyrenees (where General Gomes Freire de Andrade would fight), closing its ports to the French and sending help to the British to establish a blockade on the French coasts[7].

Soon, Spain and Portugal would notice that this war was not very advantageous for them. The Spanish government did not get along with the English cabinet: they clashed in the Mediterranean, they argued over subsidies and disagreements arose on their politics. The Spaniards protested because the English did not have the same vision as they did about the position that the son of Louis XVI should have but, above all, the smuggling in their American possessions engaged them[8]. Therefore, Spain would be the first to embark on negotiations to achieve peace with the revolutionary power, due to its deep financial problems and the French conquests of northern Spain, with the following entry of revolutionary ideas feared by Godoy[9]. Likewise, the continuation of the war furthered the neglect of the American colonies, which caused the increase of the English commercial influence in the Spanish overseas possessions[10]. But the most significant setback that the English had committed as allies was the secret signature of Jay’s treaty, in November 1794, with the United States[11]. Furthermore, in 1795, the signing of the alliances of England with Austria and Russia, in February and May, made the relations between Spain and Great Britain become more and more bitter, provoking the final signing of peace with France in Basel[12].

On the other hand, Portugal did not have the impression of being at war with France, instead it considered itself in a state of neutrality concerning to it[13]. As we have already seen, in the spring of 1795, England wanted to continue the war against France, since the counterrevolutionary alliances would become on September 28 a triple-alliance treaty to fight against France[14]. At the same time, as the Portuguese government saw that the benefits of the war against the revolutionary power were insufficient, it took advantage of the Spanish-French negotiations to try to clarify its indefinite diplomatic situation. In April, Portugal defended its position of neutrality respecting France and not of war. It was shielding itself in the fact that compliance with its treaties with Spain led it to assist with troops. And it could not be considered as an act of hostility towards France, as the closure of Portuguese ports to French ships was caused by one of the articles of the treaty signed with England[15].


The Peace of Basel and the Treaty of San Ildefonso (1795-1796)

The signing without previous notice of the peace of Basel between Spain and France, put England and Portugal in a somewhat delicate situation. For Spain, it opened new diplomatic channels, as it was no longer at war with France and England, so that it could opt for neutrality, but: was it possible to maintain strict neutrality to the struggle of the two great powers of the moment?[16]. On the other hand, for England it meant the loss of an ally (Portugal) that could change sides, meanwhile, Portugal saw by one of the articles of the peace of Basel that its situation with respect to France was that of belligerent, since Charles IV set himself as mediator to get the peace of several European powers with France, being Portugal among them. A possible French invasion deeply worried the Portuguese, either in the colonies or in the continental territory, hence the choice to make peace with the Directory[17].

During the peace negotiations in Basel, the French Directory had already proposed to Spain the signing of an alliance treaty in order to renew the dynamic of the union of the two main powers during the 18th century[18], but the Spanish government had confined itself to the signature of the peace, leaving an open door to the continuance of neutrality. For Manuel Godoy, neutrality would not be enough to maintain dynastic interests and overseas possessions, so he was forced to abandon the autonomous line due to the economic and military incapacity of the country, and surrendered to the French proposals to sign an alliance[19]. At first, the Prince of Peace was very clear that he preferred the French as allies, rather than maintaining neutrality with England, which should not mean war with the between Spain and the latter[20].

The reasons that led the Spanish Prime minister to think like this were related to the integrity of the peninsular territory, the safeguard of American possessions and of Spain´s dynastic interests[21]. In the first place, if the alliance with France were concluded, the threat of a possible French invasion would be eliminated[22]. On the other hand, there were the dynastic interests, centred on the safeguarding of the Parmesan, Neapolitan and Portuguese states, where family members of the Spanish Royal Family were[23]. This preoccupation should be grouped with the maintenance of the overseas empire, where the dispute between the two great powers showed that no one could be neutral and were forced to join one of them[24]. Although Godoy tried to exhaust the possibility of being neutral concerning to England, finally the threat of a British attack in the American territory, caused the union of the French and Spanish forces, in order to keep back the English from the overseas empire[25].

In another way, the alliance with France came to stabilize the position of Manuel Godoy in power, after the attempts of conspiracy of Malaspina and Picornell and the birth of the so-called English “party” in the Spanish court[26]. The French government would offer the support it lacked within the court of Madrid. Also, the two lines of Spanish diplomacy over the course of the eighteenth century re-emerged: the fight against the ambition of the English and the confrontation with Austria for the interests of Spain in the Italian territory[27]. During the whole century, it was feared that England was the hegemonic world power that led Spain to the signing pacts with France. That is, the balance was achieved because Spain and France were equal to England[28].

Finally, the Spanish-French alliance was achieved with the signing of the Treaty of San Ildefonso on August 18, 1796. Through it, the old policy of Family Pacts was renewed, but in this case, without family[29]. In this treaty it was stipulated that the only enemy of Spain and France was England, since it was obvious that the union of the forces of these two powers were able to face the English[30]. In these moments, the counter-revolutionary conflicts which had been born with the Revolution and which had the objective to restrain the expansion of the revolutionary ideology, happened to be confrontations of colonial and commercial character as throughout the 18th century. But the classic eighteenth-century alliances now became a power struggle between France and England, where the secondary powers (Portugal and Spain) occupied the role of “auxiliary powers”, allowing the former to fulfil their political objectives[31].

On the other hand, after Basel and the first negotiations of the alliance between France and Spain, the Portuguese government decided to remain as neutral respect to France, which would be denied to the first, since its state was undoubtedly as belligerent. Thus began a hesitant policy with the opening of negotiations with the Directory, first of neutrality and later of peace, which could lead to the breakdown of friendship with England; while he continued helping his ally in his fight against France[32]. Portugal was in the situation to choose between maintaining its overseas possessions thanks to the protection of the British navy, which would mean it would have to face the Spanish-French continental power. This would lead to an immediate consequence of the invasion of the country or submit to the wishes of the French and Spanish governments to close the ports to the British ships, which would be a huge loss to their economy and would leave the Portuguese colonies unprotected. Luis Pinto de Sousa, Portugal´s Foreign Affairs minister, tried to keep the alliance that was most favourable to him: the English one, while following a policy of dubious neutrality that allowed to gain time in front of Spain and France[33].

Since the beginning, the Directory wanted to isolate England, leaving it without allies in Europe, since it was not so easy to defeat it at sea. Hence it continually urged the Spanish government to exercise the mediation that had been conferred on in Basel[34]. The French government was fully aware of Portugal’s role on the diplomatic board, as well as the importance of controlling Portuguese ports. The English domination exercised over Portuguese territory greatly facilitated its power at sea, since it prevented the union of the Brest fleet with that of the Mediterranean; therefore, the objective of French policy was to eliminate this English control. On the other hand, the maintenance of English ships in Portugal, both to exercise piracy and to supply themselves, was an obstacle for the Spanish navy, since it was easier for the British to attack Spanish positions from Portuguese ports. The Portuguese also complained that the shelter provided by the Spanish coasts against French ships harmed them in their trade by the numerous losses[35].

The negotiations began but the French demands seemed too high for the Portuguese: 25 million pounds as compensation, the lands of the north of the Amazon and the freedom of navigation of that river. Also, they asked for the expulsion of the English ships from the Portuguese ports, as well as the admission of French ships, most favored nation clause and the introduction of French manufactures in their territory[36]. On the other hand, although the French requests were quite extreme, Portugal considered that Spain or France could take some of their possessions. In fact, Charles IV sent troops to the border as a means of pressure for Portugal to force them into peace with the French cabinet[37], although the only objective the Spanish monarch had was to get of the British domination over Portugal and disallow the French attack. Charles IV had Portugal as one of his fundamental interests, because his daughter Carlota Joaquina, was married to Regent Prince João and intended to mediate and protect the kingdom which his descendants would rule in the future. Faced with this situation, Spain tried by all means to convince the Portuguese government that its only solution is to sign peace with the French and move away from the British alliance[38].

Meanwhile, England was pursuing a policy that did not favour the Portuguese[39]. The English government focused on its own interests and problems, ignoring the requests for help from Portugal[40]. After the signing of the Spanish-French alliance and the conjuncture of a possible war between England and Spain. Portugal declared its neutrality in September 1796, towards the failed negotiations to resolve its situation with respect to France, but kept its ports open to the English[41]. Furthermore, in October, Luis Pinto sent Araujo de Azevedo to Paris to discuss possible articles of peace with the Directory, while the Portuguese government told to English that he would never accept French requests[42]. An accurate example of the double political game of the Portuguese.


Failed peace negotiations

After the signing of the Spanish-French alliance, the impossibility of maintaining neutrality with England became evident. The Spanish government continued to think that the English cabinet “no deseaba menos destruir nuestra marina que la marina francesa”[43]. Moreover, the alliance between England and Portugal, taking into account the control that the former exercised over the latter, meant for Spain to feel the threat of the English on the same Spanish-Portuguese border, as well as in the overseas territories where they were neighbors[44]. For all of this, Spain decided to help France in its fight against British hegemony at sea and finally the much feared war was declared in October 1796.

In spite of the declaration of war against England, in the last quarter of the year 1796 things seemed to calm down. The situation of shortage that Great Britain dragged since 1795, caused the British people call for peace[45]. The English cabinet answered with a peaceful speech, which for the rest of powers was nothing more than a trick of the prime minister William Pitt to gain time throughout the year of 1796. But in the summer, the English diplomatic situation worsened: his great ally, Portugal, was talking peace with the Directory. On the other hand, Spain was emerging as a new enemy to take into account after the signing at San Ildefonso and the French victories in German and Italian territory did not stop, at the same time that the economic crisis was accentuated, which led to the English cabinet to change their position[46].

In September, London requested passports to the republican government to authorize an English plenipotentiary in the French capital; although there were variations in the election at the end of October when James Harris, 1st earl of Malmesbury arrived[47]. The ambassador´s main mission was to obtain the approval of the republican government to carry out a general negotiation, but in case the opportunity arose, he had full powers to treat peace separately. England wanted to negotiate with Austria, but did not want to count on Spain and Holland. However, the Spanish government had already decided to name the Marquis del Campo as plenipotentiary in that general negotiation, but barely had time to perform[48]. The high demands of the British cabinet, which wanted France to leave Belgium and restitution each other’s conquests[49], in addition the hostile policy between the two powers and Austria’s refusal to participate in the negotiations, caused them to fail in November and Malmesbury left Paris the following month[50].

In this conjuncture, Portugal would try to get rid of the Spanish mediation, which they considered as a nuisance. Antonio de Araújo had been sent to treat the Portuguese peace directly, but soon the impediments would arise and the negotiations would be ruined. First, there was the question of the borders between French Guiana and Brazil, the Portuguese refused to give up the extensive territories demanded by the French, to close the ports to the English ships and complained about the high compensation. To understand these demands, we must bear in mind that at the end of 1796, France suffered important military defeats and continued with an important economic crisis[51]. Secondly, the English cabinet wanted to take advantage of the fact that Malmesbury was in Paris, so that he would deal directly with the Portuguese issues instead of being done by Araújo. Thus, the English government would manage to control the negotiations, but this situation ended causing the abandonment of the Franco-Portuguese peace talks[52]. Following the idea of ​​Guyot, it seems that the English cabinet only wanted to tempt a possible negotiation that would allow him to reorganize the coalition and gain time, eliminating the danger of a possible invasion[53].

At the beginning of 1797, Portugal was still afraid of a possible French invasion from Spanish territory, while Spain continued to pressure the Portuguese government to commit itself not to help the English, despite the neutrality they defended. The problem is that it would be equivalent to economic ruin and the loss of the Portuguese overseas territories[54]. Both Spain and Portugal were interested in maintaining their trade between their colonial territories. Portugal achieved it with the protection of England[55], but Spain suffered new setbacks for Spanish arms with the loss of the battle of San Vicente, a prelude to Trafalgar, the conquest of Trinidad (both events happening in February) and the blockade of Cádiz (in April), which made it difficult for the metropolis to communicate with the colonies and that allowed the British to recover their strategic positions in the Mediterranean[56]. Great Britain also suffered several setbacks in Tenerife, Cádíz and Puerto Rico from the Spanish[57]. These English attacks showed that the British fleet used Portuguese ports as a base[58], which gave them a significant advantage that destabilized the diplomatic game.

In the spring of 1797, everyone seemed to wish peace. Portugal tried to reach an agreement with France which would fail in April, but it was still in order to gain time to strengthen its link with Great Britain, shielding itself from the fact that its government did not need urgently to make peace with France, but it really did not want to lose the commercial advantages and protection of Portugal´s great ally[59]. On the other hand, through the Portuguese court, the English cabinet proposed peace to Godoy but he refused[60]. In April, the armistice of Leoben was signed between France and Austria and, together with the economic shortage and the military weariness of the English, led him to propose the opening of a great congress to treat European peace[61].

The congress of Lille, in which the Spanish, Dutch and Portuguese plenipotentiaries would not be given a voice, the negotiations failed between Malmesbury and Talleyrand. This situation gives us an idea of ​​the bilateral policy pursued by these two powers which would not take their allies into account and prioritize their personal agenda[62]. The Spanish diplomacy also tried to take a separate diplomatic line, with an approach to the English government by sending François Cabarrús to Lille. While it was clear that France would not fight for Spanish interests. The demands of Cabarrús to restore every conquest to its original possession, the renunciation of Spain from its alliance with France, the commercial concessions and the renunciation of Nootka, were too much to consider. Also, Godoy refused to the plan of the Directory to yield Louisiana in exchange for the aggrandizement of Parma[63]. The Spanish prime minister was only concerned with ending the suffocating war and maintaining the support of the Directory[64]. Finally, in September, the congress of Lille would end without any meaningful result[65].

In the summer of 1797, Araujo de Azevedo was again accepted as plenipotentiary and talks for the Franco-Portuguese peace agreement were resumed in July[66]. The Portuguese government feared the Spanish-French attack and remained isolated, in face of the possible peace agreement of England and Austria with France. This treaty was made very quickly, through rather turbulent and opaque negotiations[67] and barely without any Spanish mediation, because for the Portuguese it was only a hindrance. The peace treaty was signed on August 10 and without going into the analysis of his articles, it pleased the Portuguese court, since it managed to stop the detriment in trade caused by the continuation of the war, as well as for the Directory, as it meant pushing away Portugal from England. France obtained territories in Brazil, an important monetary sum and also dismissed the conquest of Portugal and dedicates its military efforts in Italy and Egypt. Meanwhile, for Spain, it meant to eliminate the possibility of French troops passing through its territory and moving away from the British threat from its coasts[68].

When Charles IV began to withdraw his troops from the Portuguese frontier, ignoring the invasion plans that had been prepared months earlier[69], when there was nothing left to do than wait for the Portuguese ratification of the treaty. England decided to send troops to Lisbon to show their disagreement with the signed peace; since this treaty could leave it isolated and ended the maritime plans of attack on Spain which required the use of Portuguese ports[70]. The English pressure imposed on the Portuguese government not to confirm the peace and they were forced to discuss those articles with which England did not agree in the congress of Lille[71].

Portugal founded itself between two possibilities: if it ratified the peace with France it closed one of its serious problems. But if it did, England would eliminate the aid that the British Navy carried out in its colonies, as well as they knew that these would be conquered immediately. On the other hand, if it were not ratified, the French invasion would begin inmediately[72]. France realized the overbearing ability of England to dominate the Portuguese government. At this juncture, Spain was struggling to secure the ratification of the treaty with Portugal, whose government ordered the Marquis of Pombeiro to convince the English ministers of the need for the ratification, while requesting an extension to the Directory[73]. The English Cabinet approved, not without difficulties, the ratification in November; but the French had already declared it void after the signing of the Peace of Campo-Formio, which left England practically without allies and spoiled Cabarrús’s plan to obtain peace separately between England and Spain[74].


Towards war drift

At the end of the year, the situation did not improve, Araújo was imprisoned in the Temple accused of bribery. Spain fought for his freedom, which took place in March 1798[75] and for the ratification of the treaty, while Luis Pinto returned to outline to Godoy the separate peace with England[76]. In a conjunction so favourable for France, the republican government did not want the ratification of the previous treaty. It sought to obtain greater advantages than those already achieved or continue with its plans to conquest Portuguese territory to chase out the English. This was so in order to be able to face them more easily in his struggle for control of the sea with the help of the Spanish fleet. It needed to convince the Spanish government and for that he sent the schemers Perrochel, Carency and Seguí and concentrated troops in Perpignan[77]. While the continuous attempts of the Spanish diplomacy (including the bribes and the changes of diplomats), followed to obtain the peace and that the Portuguese possessions were not invaded. Godoy was playing a double diplomacy at that moment; since he was trying to support his ally, who wanted to convince him to carry out the plan of joint invasion. At the same time he had his own policy avoiding the Portuguese conquest (Charles IV’s main interest), dodging the occupation of Spanish territory, while participating in the intrigues against the French government which would motivate his fall[78].

Soon, France, would change plans because in the summer the time was right to launch the re-conquest of Malta and the attack of English possessions in Egypt, since the invasion of England was impossible at the moment. In this way, the French troops would not be left unused in a second-order expedition such as the Portuguese one[79]. In August, the disaster of the French Navy in Aboukir happened, in which the Portuguese fleet joined the one commanded by Admiral Horatio Nelson, who would beat in their try to conquest of the British of Menorca, in November[80]. But Portugal struggled to put aside its diplomatic isolation and opted for a position of greater strength, uniting in alliance with Russia, a power that had declared war on Spain[81].

This manoeuvre of the Portuguese government was not seen with good eyes by the Spanish government, since it raised a possible Russian attack through the Portuguese territories. The Portuguese peace with France was deemed impossible at this point. France focused on the plans of conquest, while Portugal wanted to see England succeed. Spain, meanwhile, followed the policy of the Directory despite the new openings of peace that came from Naples and Russia[82]. The Spanish cabinet demanded that Portugal should send away the English, but they were hiding that the same could come from Spain. Little by little, Spain would yield to the wishes of the French government, accentuating its dependence, who always asked for more collaboration and the plan to attack Portugal will take shape[83]. On the other hand, the problems grew for the revolutionary government with the failed Rastatt congress and the birth of the second coalition, where Russia and Portugal pressured Spain to join[84].

When 1800 arrived, Portugal insisted on requesting the Spanish mediation to achieve peace, but the French and Portuguese cabinets did not agree on their demands, to which was added the refusal from England. From France, the Spanish government was urged to break relations with the Portuguese. Since the latter refused to make peace, it was better to obtain some provinces that could be exchanged by Menorca in a general congress and France would be willing to cede troops for it. The union of Portugal and Great Britain constituted a great obstacle to war at sea and always caused conflicts between France and Spain[85].

It was intended to isolate Britain, attacking it by sea and its continental enclave: Portugal. And the latter will be achieved by Luciano Bonaparte convincing Charles IV of the aggrandizement of the duchy of Parma in exchange for the attack on the Portuguese territory. In the Madrid convention, it was established that the control of the operations would be Spanish and the campaign could be prepared as Spain wanted[86]. Even so, the objectives of the two allies were not the same: Charles IV intended a conventional war to only move away from the British shadow and achieve the alliance of the three powers, while Napoleon Bonaparte wanted the disappearance of the Portuguese monarchy or otherwise conquer their provinces to exchange them for the British[87].

At the same time, peace was being addressed in the heart of Europe, where the Luneville congress was being held. Initially, there was a desire to deal with general peace. Here, Portugal aspired to achieve peace, but eventually England would not come, putting an end to the negotiations. The emperor signed peace with France and created the league of neutrals (Russia, Sweden, Denmark and Prussia). Britain was left alone, as was Portugal, which was not going to receive the help it had requested from its ally[88]. Faced with this situation, the war reopened and began the so-called “War of the Oranges”, after the refusal to the ultimatum sent by Charles IV that demanded breaking relations with England, the closure of Portuguese ports to English ships and the concession for that the Spanish army occupied several Portuguese provinces that could later be exchanged in a congress for Trinidad, Mahón and Malta, as well as indemnities[89].



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[1]    La Torre Gómez 2003, 287.

[2]    Two of these pacts were signed under the reign of Felipe V, in 1733 and 1743, respectively, and the last of them was concluded during the reign of Carlos III in 1761.

[3]    La Torre Gómez 2003, 293.

[4]    The French declaration of war against England took place on February 1, 1793, while France declared war on Spain on March 7, 1793.

[5]    Chinchilla Galarzo, a. En prensa.

[6]    La Torre Gómez 2003, 294.

[7]    Godechot 1973, 283; Borges de Macedo 1987, 331.

[8]    Fugier 2008, 16-7.

[9]    Giménez López 1996, 58; La Parra López 1992, 17.

[10]    La Parra López 1992, 17; Fugier 1967, 874.

[11]    Seco Serrano 1988, 564.

[12]    Chinchilla Galarzo, a. En prensa.

[13]    Godechot 1973, 283; Embajada de España en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4437. Letter from the Marquis of Oyra to Manuel Godoy, Lisbon, April 30, 1795

[14]    Guyot 1977, 94-5.

[15]    Embajada de España en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4437. Letter from the Marquis of Oyra to Manuel Godoy, Lisbon, May 10, 1795.

[16]    Seco Serrano 1988, 563.

[17]    Barreiros 1958, 6.

[18]    Fugier 2008, 15-6.

[19]    Chinchilla Galarzo, b. En prensa.

[20]    La Parra López 2005, 134-5.

[21]    Ibidem 2003, 228-9.

[22]    La Parra López 2005, 135-6; Hamnett 1985, 45-6.

[23]    In Parma, Infanta Maria Luisa, married with the Infante Luis of Parma, heir of the dukedom; in Naples, Charles IV of Spain´s brother, Fernando IV, was there, and in Portugal, Infanta Carlota Joaquina, married to the Prince Regent, soon-to-be King John VI.

[24]    Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3401. Letter of Manuel Godoy to Domingo de Iriarte, San Ildefonso, September 10, 1795.

[25]    La Parra López 2005, 135-6; Lafuente y Zamalloa 1889, 243; Moreno Alonso 2003, 325.

[26]    Giménez López 1996, 48-9; La Parra López 1992, 33; La Parra López 2005, 134.

[27]    Seco Serrano 1988, 569-70.

[28]    Jover Zamora 1999, 100-3.

[29]    Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3404. Treaty project s.f./s.l. To deepen on the theme of the Treaty of San Ildefonso: Chinchilla Galarzo, b. En prensa.

[30]    Jover Zamora 1999, 100-3.

[31]    La Torre Gómez 2003, 293.

[32]    Vicente 1998, 161.

[33]    La Torre Gómez 2003, 294; Soares Martínez 1992, 214.

[34]    Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3401. Letter of Domingo de Iriarte to Manuel Godoy, Basel, September 7, 1795; Lefebvre 1977, 320.

[35]    Despachos para as legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Livro 106. Several letters show these complaints.

[36]    Guyot 1977, 244-5; La Parra López 1992, 52; Despachos para as legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Livro 106. Letter of Luis Pinto de Sousa to Diego de Carvalho e Sampaio, Queluz, July 18, 1796.

[37]    Ventura 2001, 974-5.

[38]    La Parra 2003, 223-35; Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 6677; Correspondência das legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Caixa 642.

[39]    Malafaia 2006, 281.

[40]    Despachos para as legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Livro 106. Letter of Luis Pinto de Sousa to João de Almeida de Mello, Queluz, June 25, 1796.

[41]    Ventura 2001, 976.

[42]    Despachos para as legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Livro 106. Letter of Luis Pinto de Sousa to marquis of Pombal, Queluz, August 9, 1796.

[43]    Moreno Alonso 2003, 325.

[44]    Telo and La Torre Gómez 2000, 182-3.

[45]    Fugier 1967, 885.

[46]    Guyot 1977, 270-1.

[47]    Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3998. Letter of Bernardo del Campo to Manuel Godoy, Paris, October 23, 1796.

[48]    Guyot 1977, 288 and 293; Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3998. Letter of Bernardo del Campo to Manuel Godoy, Paris, October 29, 1796.

[49]    Fonseca 1986, 122.

[50]    France continues with its project of invasion of England with the landing in Ireland and with its idea to block her with the prohibition to buy English stuffs, as much in France as in Holland; while England sent its fleet to the Mediterranean and conquered the Dutch possessions in India. Lefebvre 1977, 320 and 363; Guyot 1977, 294 and 299; Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3998. Letter of Bernardo del Campo to Manuel Godoy, Paris, November 2, 1796 and letter of Bernardo del Campo to Manuel Godoy, Paris, December 18, 1796.

[51]    Fonseca 1986, 126-9 and 139; Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 6677. Letter of Diego de Carvalho to François Perignon, San Lorenzo, September 24, 1796.

[52]    Embajada de España en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3998. Letter of Bernardo del Campo to Manuel Godoy, Paris, October 29, 1796.

[53]    Guyot 1977, 387.

[54]    La Torre 2003, 294; Correspondência das legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Caixa 643.

[55]    Telo and La Torre Gómez 2000, 20-1.

[56]    Hamnett 1985, 46; Giménez López 1996, 66; Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4534. Several letters show the detrimental effect for Spanish trade.

[57]    Giménez López 1996, 66-8; Martínez Ruiz 1999, 36.

[58]    Ventura 2001, 977; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4019. Letter of Bernardo del Campo a Manuel Godoy, Paris, April 1, 1797; Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4421. Letter of Antonio Porlier to Manuel Godoy, Lisbon, February 12, 1797.

[59]    Fonseca 1986, 129.

[60]    Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4437; Despachos para as legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Livro 107. Letter of Luis Pinto de Sousa to Manuel Godoy, Queluz, April 5, 1797; Ventura 2001, 978.

[61]    The armistice of Leoben was signed on April 18, 1797 and left Austria out of the war. Fugier 1967, 889-90; Giménez López 1996, 68.

[62]    La Parra 1992, 125; Giménez López 1996, 68; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3851 and 6670.

[63]    Moreno Alonso 2003, 325-6; La Parra 1992, 125-30; Giménez López 1996, 72; Guyot 1977, 403 and 429-30; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3946 and 6670.

[64]    La Parra 1992, 126-7.

[65]    Gagé 1950, 40; Fugier 1967, 889-90; Lefebvre 1977, 397; Guyot 1977, 437 and 473.

[66]    Soares Martínez 1992, 214; Ventura 2001, 979; Correspondência das legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Caixa 643.

[67]    Fonseca 1986, 153-4; Malafaia 2006, 282-3; La Parra 1992, 52.

[68]    La Parra 1992, 134-40; Soares Martínez 1992, 214; Barreiros 1958, 11-3.

[69]    Barreiros 1958, 17; Gagé 1950, 60-6. Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4437; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4019.

[70]    Barreiros 1958, 17; Malafaia 2006, 282; Fonseca 1986, 170; Ventura 2001, 965; Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4437.

[71]    Barreiros 1958, 14.

[72]    Fonseca 1986, 171-3; Malafaia 2006, 282.

[73]    Fonseca 1986, 179; Barreiros 1958, 18; Correspondência das legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Caixa 643; Despachos para as legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Livro 107.

[74]    Fonseca 1986, 179; Barreiros 1958, 15-6; La Parra López 1992, 134-5; Fugier 1967, 890; Lefebvre 1977, 585.

[75]    Gagé 1950, 60; Brazão 1940, 185; Malafaia 2006, 283-4.

[76]    La Parra López 1992, 146-7; Ventura 2001, 987-8; Barreiros 1958, 20-2.

[77]    Ventura 2001, 987; Giménez López 1996, 72-3; Ventura 2003, 578; La Parra López 1992, 147-54; Guyot 1977, 580-4 and 723-4; Gagé 1950, 67; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4019.

[78]    Ventura 2001, 989; Soares Martínez 1992, 215; Seco Serrano 1988, 583-4; La Parra López 1992, 161; Gagé 1950, 66 and 72; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4022.

[79]    Seco Serrano 1988, 592; Fugier 1967, 892; Brazão 1940, 185.

[80]    Gagé 1950, 66; Lefebvre 1977, 586 and 599; Guyot 1977, 723-4; Barreiros 1958, 38; Fugier 1967, 892-3; Giménez López 1996, 78; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4022.

[81]    Correspondência das legações portuguesas. Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros. Caixa 644; La Parra López 1992, 295-6.

[82]    Seco Serrano 1988, 592-4; La Parra López 1992, 82 and 86; Brazão 1940, 185-6; Giménez López 1996, 77-8.

[83]    Godechot 1973, 286; Borges de Macedo 1987, 332; Vicente 2001, 1124; Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4407.

[84]    The treaty by which the second coalition is formed is signed on December 18, 1798. Lefebvre 1977, 610-1; Seco Serrano 1988, 599; La Parra López 1988-1990, 222-3; Giménez López 1996, 77.

[85]    La Parra López 1992, 295-6; Brazão 1940, 187; Giménez López 1996, 86; Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4454.

[86]    The Madrid Convention was ratified on January 29, 1801; La Parra López 1992, 295; Seco Serrano 1988, 620; Vicente 2001, 1126.

[87]    Seco Serrano 1988, 620; La Parra López 1992, 295-6.

[88]    Brazão 1940, 186-7; Vicente 2001, 1124 and 1132; Seco Serrano 1988, 623-4; Embajada española en París. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 3963; Embajada española en Lisboa. Secretaría de Estado y del Despacho de Estado. Legajo 4486.

[89]    La Parra López 1992, 295; Brazão 1940, 187-8; Giménez López 1996, 86; Soares Martínez 1992, 215-6.

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by CMG Armando Dias Correia